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IS SELF-REGULATION ENOUGH
TODAY?: EVALUATING THE
RECOMBINANT DNA
CONTROVERSY
Charles Weiner*
THE RECOMBINANT DNA CONTROVERSY is some-
times cited today as relevant to current controversies about the
control of new or proposed genetic technologies such as human
cloning and human germ-line intervention.1 In the late 1970s, the
concern was about the potential health and environmental hazards
of novel research techniques that made it possible to manipulate
genes, opening the path to genetic engineering. The researchers,
their institutions, and their funding agencies developed a system of
self-regulation to avoid hazards and to forestall legislative control.
They focused on the means and not the ends; on the tools of ge-
netic engineering rather than on the moral limits. I will outline the
history of this process, with emphasis on aspects of it that are rele-
vant to current concerns.2
* Professor Emeritus of History of Science and Technology, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. Ph.D., Case Institute of Technology, 1965; B.S., Case Insti-
tute of Technology, 1960.
1 Paul Berg & Maxine Singer, Regulating Human Cloning, 282 SCIENCE 413
(1998) (asserting that anti-cloning legislation could inadvertently inhibit or delay
research on diseases and the development of new therapies). See also Claire Nader &
Stuart A. Newman, Human Cloning, 282 SCIENCE 1824 (1998) (disagreeing with the
proposition that recombinant DNA research should be unregulated because of the
biological and ethical issues raised by human cloning); Doris Teichier Zallen, The
Public as a Partner at the Laboratory Bench, 12 TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 107
(1994) (explaining how the current "vigorous state of health" of research into recom-
binant DNA is a result of the system of review developed in the mid-1970s, and how
this is applicable to present-day issues arising due to advances in genetic technology).
2 This historical summary draws on my observations and documentation of the
recombinant DNA controversy utilizing archival materials deposited in the Recombi-
nant DNA History Collection available for study at the Institute Archives and Special
Collections, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. See Charles Weiner, Anticipating
the Consequences of Genetic Engineering: Past, Present, and Future, in ARE GENES
Us? THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEw GENETICS 31 (Carl F. Cranor ed., 1994)
(providing portions of this account). There are well-documented histories and analy-
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At the Gordon Research Conference on Nucleic Acids in July
1973, invited specialists on DNA research heard fascinating re-
ports of new techniques for manipulating and moving genetic ma-
terial. The use of the newly discovered restriction enzymes made it
possible to cut strands of DNA at specified, precise points and to
insert them into the DNA of other organisms, combining the he-
reditary material of animals and bacteria. These recombinant or-
ganisms could be replicated in billions of copies through cloning.
It was apparent to the scientists involved that they had a new tool
for studying the structure and functions of genes and to probe the
details of DNA and its transcription in cells of higher organisms.
Biologists recognized that this would open up a new field of work,
enabling the posing of fundamental research questions that would
not have been feasible before, and to get answers that would help
solve problems at the forefront of knowledge that would have im-
portant applications.
Amid the excitement about the potential of the new recombi-
nant DNA techniques, some of the conference participants were
alarmed over its possible hazards, not down the line when the ap-
plications were imminent, but in their own laboratories. They were
concerned that the techniques might cause unforeseen hazards to
human health and the environment. There was a possibility that
harmless microbes could be unintentionally changed into human
pathogens through the introduction of antibiotic resistance, which
was part of the technique; through the production of dangerous
toxins, which was a possible outcome; or through the transforma-
tion into cancer-causing agents of materials that previously were
benign. In this relatively new field there was a great deal of un-
certainty and little information about the risks.
The Gordon Conference participants asked for a special dis-
cussion of these larger questions. At that brief special session, they
decided to write a letter to ask the National Academy of Sciences
to study the potential hazards and to devise a plan to do something
about them. They voted by a large majority to compose the letter
ses drawing on the MIT collection and other sources. See SHELDON KRimSKY,
GENETIC ALcHEMY: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE RECOMBINANT DNA CONTROVERSY
(photo reprint 1985) (1982) (examining the social, political, and scientific controver-
sies concerning gene-transplantation research); SUSAN WRIGHT, MOLECULAR
POLITICS: DEVELOPING AMERICAN AND BRITISH REGULATORY POLICY FOR GENETIC
ENGINEERING, 1972-1982 (1994) (examining inter alia the history of social interests
in the promotion and control of science and technology, the emergence and evolution
of genetic engineering, and the legislative and institutional response to the recombi-
nant DNA controversy).
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and they approved the content of it. They also voted, this time by a
slim majority, to send a copy of the letter to be published in the
journal Science. The reluctance of many of the participating scien-
tists to call public attention to the problem was an indication of a
continuing conflict. They were concerned about a possible public
health problem, and yet they feared that talking about it publicly
might bring intrusion, as they saw it, into the scientific process.
The Gordon Conference letter, replete with technical language,
was intended for other scientists. It was published in the journal
Science in 19733 and did not generate much public attention.4
The National Academy asked Paul Berg, a distinguished bio-
chemist and a principal researcher in the field, to organize a group
of scientists to consider the issues. They met at Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology on April 17, 1974 and planned a conference
for February 1975 to evaluate the hazards of the research and ways
of dealing with them. Feeling a sense of urgency, they also drafted
a letter to alert the larger community of biologists. Two months
after the MIT meeting, Berg described these actions and the
group's motivations in a letter to a colleague in England:
We met at MIT for a day and settled on the idea of calling
a conference next February of those scientists working on
methods of joining DNA molecules and particularly those
involved in constructing hybrid DNAs. It was our plan that
one of the major purposes of the Conference, besides a re-
port on the scientific progress, would be a wide ranging
discussion of potential hazards growing out of these types
of experiments. Were there any experiments that should
not be done? How could such a moratorium be proposed or
enforced? In short, we expected a frank and searching re-
view of what people were doing or wanted to do, particu-
larly from the point of view of whether they should be
done. But as we talked we realized that the pace of events
might not wait for February and that some of the experi-
ments many people would agree could be hazardous would
be done (e.g., attempts to fuse portions of Herpes DNA to
3 See KRIMSKY, supra note 2, at 70-80 (providing a detailed account of the
development of the Gordon Conference letter).
4 Maxine Singer & Dieter Soil, Letter, Guidelines for DNA Hybrid Molecules,
181 ScIENcE 1114 (1973) (publishing letter sent to Phillip Handler, President of the
National Academy of Sciences, and to John R. Hongress, President of the National
Institute of Medicine).
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appropriate plasmids for cloning in E. coli were immi-
nent). Since the technology for constructing hybrids has
become ridiculously simple, that fear was well-founded.
Consequently we decided to devise a letter to be submitted
to Science and Nature calling on scientists to defer certain
kinds of experiments until these potential hazards could be
better evaluated and certainly until there was an opportu-
nity to discuss the issues at the February meeting.
Drafts of the Berg committee letter were circulated privately
among the relevant scientists, and in July 1974, the final version
was published in Science6 and Nature.7 Why did they go public?
Because the committee felt it was the quickest way to bring the
potential hazards to the attention of the community of researchers
who would be likely to use the new recombinant DNA techniques.
They felt that the situation was urgent because of pending experi-
ments and because the power and fruitfulness of these research
tools rapidly would attract many scientists to the field who were
not experienced in handling pathogenic organisms. The letter
called for a voluntary moratorium, a temporary deferral of those
experiments which at the time were thought to be potentially haz-
ardous. This appeal for self-restraint was linked to an end point,
the conference scheduled for February 1975.
The February 1975 meeting at the Asilomar Conference Cen-
ter in California evaluated knowledge in the field and its potential
for research. It was the equivalent of an international review con-
ference which ordinarily would be held well into the development
of a research field and not at such a very early stage. The detailed
review enabled the conference participants, who were the re-
searchers and the potential researchers in the field, to consider the
potential risks and ways to control them. The motive from the start
was to avoid public interference and to demonstrate that scientists
on their own could protect laboratory workers, the public, and the
environment. Of course, there is that contradiction again: they
5 Letter from Paul Berg, Chairman, Committee on Recombinant DNA Mole-
cules Assembly of Life Sciences National Research Council, to Hans Kornberg (June
18, 1974), available in Recombinant DNA History Collection, supra note 2.
6 Paul Berg et al., Letter, Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Mole-
cules, 185 SCIENCE 303 (1974) (proposing recommendations to scientists regarding
the potential hazards of emerging DNA research capabilities).
7 250 NATuRE 175 (1974). The last paragraph was omitted in this version of the
letter.
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were dealing with a public health issue and were simultaneously
attempting to keep the public out of it.
The organizers intended to exclude the press from the confer-
ence, but relented when a prominent science writer threatened to
bring a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against them since the
meeting was funded by the National Institutes of Health. A deal
was struck with sixteen individuals, most of whom were invited,
that they would not report on the conference until it was over be-
cause things would be too much in flux. That pleased the reporters
because they did not have to call in stories to their editors every
day. Instead, the telephone booths were jammed with scientists
calling their laboratories in Europe and the United States about the
need to tool up for this very exciting new research. The conference
gave them an opportunity to learn as much as possible about the
recombinant DNA techniques, and it stimulated the growth of the
field while producing a framework for pursuing it safely.
Several technical working groups met independently over a
period of months in preparation for the conference. The most ac-
tive was the Plasmid Working Group, focusing on the circular
pieces of DNA which were the main tools for this new technique.
They scoured the literature and their own knowledge, talked with
other people in the field, and produced a very deep technical
document. 8 Reports of the working groups were presented and dis-
cussed at the meeting and one session was devoted to presentations
of lawyers on policy and liability issues. Participants paid special
attention to their legal responsibility for damage resulting from
their laboratory work. The narrow technical focus of the confer-
ence was evident in the opening remarks of David Baltimore, one
of the organizers. He first acknowledged that the techniques that
were developed could have applications in a number of areas, in-
cluding biological warfare, and that it had larger societal implica-
tions, but that such issues would be excluded since there was a full
agenda of technical issues:
The issue that ... [brings] us here is that a new technique
of molecular biology appears to have allowed us to outdo
the standard events of evolution by making combinations
of genes which could be immediate natural history. These
8 See PLASMID WORKING GROUP, PROPOSED GUIDELINES ON POTENTIAL
HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH EXPERIMENTS INVOLVING GENETICALLY ALTERED
MICROORGANISMS, (1975), available in Recombinant DNA History Collection, supra
note 2.
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pose special potential hazards while they offer enormous
benefits. We are here in a sense to balance the benefits and
hazards right now and to design a strategy which will
maximize the benefits and minimize the hazards for the
future.9
What happened at Asilomar? The recombinant DNA issue was
defined as a technical problem to be solved by technical means, in
essence, a technical fix. Larger ethical issues regarding the pur-
poses and the long-term goals of the research were excluded, de-
spite the rich discussions that had occurred among geneticists and
other biologists in the 1960s about where to draw the line when it
became possible to do genetic engineering. The 1960s discussions
led to Congressional proposals for anticipatory study of the ethical
limits of genetic engineering, which were resisted as premature by
several leading biologists. 10 Instead of those longer-term issues,
the focus at Asilomar in 1975 was on safety of the newly devel-
oped technical tools for genetic engineering, on the means not the
ends.
The Asilomar participants adopted provisional safety guide-
lines based on a two-part system of physical and biological con-
tainment of potentially hazardous recombinant organisms." The
extent of physical containment was graded according to the antici-
pated level of hazard an organism might present if it escaped the
laboratory, ranging from good laboratory technique for those ex-
periments deemed to be of low hazard, to hooded glove boxes,
negative pressure, and showers and clothes changes for laboratory
workers dealing with organisms thought to be especially danger-
ous. Biological containment would introduce mutations in the or-
ganisms that were to be used in the experiments so that if they es-
caped they could not survive in the environment beyond the labo-
ratory.
In November 1974, the National Institutes of Health had es-
tablished the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAG), ad-
9 Audiotape of the International Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules,
Asilomar (Feb. 24, 1975) (on file with the Recombinant DNA History Collection).
10 Hearings on S.J. Res. 145 Before the Subcomm. on Gov't. Research of the
Senate Comm. on Gov't. Operations, 9e t Cong. (1968) (statement of Senator Walter
Mondale) (introducing the idea that some scientific advances, such as gene manipu-
lation, are potentially dangerous and must be looked at closely).
11 See Paul Berg et al., Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules,
188 SCIENCE 991 (1975) (explaining the measures adopted by the Asilomar partici-
pants).
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visory to the Director of NIH. The first meeting was held immedi-
ately after the Asilomar conference at the end of February 1975.
RAC appointees were knowledgeable researchers in the field who
were asked to develop and extend the Asilomar provisional safety
guidelines to control all recombinant DNA work at institutions re-
ceiving NIH funding of any kind. They were designing safety
protocols that had the potential for restricting their own work.
These controls were to be administered by the NIH, which funded
and encouraged the research and, therefore, was itself in a position
of conflict of interest. NIH officials acknowledged the potential
conflict, and maintained that although NIH was not a regulatory
agency, it had the best expertise in the field and needed to act in
the absence of any other government group playing a role. Similar
efforts were also underway in other countries.
During 1975 and 1976, scientists on the RAC argued about
whether the proposed guidelines were too strict or too permissive,
and the document went through many drafts. 12 All of this occurred
in the absence of risk assessment experiments. At the same time,
scientists at laboratories throughout the country were tooling up to
use the new technique and were impatiently waiting for the green
light that would allow them to proceed as rapidly as possible. They
exerted a great deal of pressure on the RAC and the NIH. The pro-
cess of establishing safety rules involved a series of compromises
aimed at achieving a consensus within that portion of the scientific
community affected by the guidelines while providing assurances
to the public that they would be protected from possible hazards.
The long-expected NIH safety guidelines for recombinant
DNA were approved by the director of NIH on June 23, 1976. On
that day when the green light flashed, an extraordinary event took
place in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Scientists from MIT and Har-
vard and representatives of NIH appeared at a special City Council
hearing. They had been invited to explain to the citizens of Cam-
bridge why the scientists themselves had been arguing about the
safety of recombinant DNA and whether the guidelines were ade-
12 The Guidelines process, including drafts and revisions, is documented by NIH
in a series starting in 1976. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, RECOMBINANT
DNA RESEARCH (1976) (providing a multi-volume series of annual compilations of
documents relating to the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA
Molecules). See also KRIMsKY, supra note 2 (discussing the process of developing
ethical and technical guidelines for genetic engineering, including the Asilomar Con-
ference and the actions of the RAC through the early 1980s); WRIGHT, supra note 2
(detailing accounts of the process including the Asilomar conference and RAC's
actions through the early 1980s).
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quate to protect the communities in which the research was to be
done. Was there any danger to citizens? Who was going to monitor
and enforce the safety standards? Could the scientists and their
universities be trusted to regulate themselves? Testimony by sev-
eral biologists that recombinant DNA techniques posed few risks
and that they could be contained by the new guidelines was coun-
tered by testimony from other biologists who argued that the
guidelines were inadequate and that they were formulated by ad-
vocates of the research. After a second hearing in July 1976, the
City Council established a citizens' review board to examine the
problem and, pending the outcome of the board's deliberations,
placed a temporary ban on experiments classified in the guidelines
as posing moderate to major hazards.
The nine-member Cambridge Experimentation Review Board
met twice weekly for a total of more than 100 hours over a four-
month period. About one half of the time was used for testimony
by scientists on both sides of the issue. The Board presented its
report to the City Council on January 5, 1977, recommending the
creation of a city biohazards committee to oversee adherence to
the NIH guidelines for all recombinant DNA work in the city
whether funded by NIH or not, and several additional safeguards
on experiment procedures, containment, and testing of organ-
isms. 13 These community confidence-building measures were in-
corporated in a City Council ordinance passed in February 1977,
which was the first recombinant DNA legislation in the United
States and was interpreted as a qualified public endorsement of the
NIH guidelines. 14
The major fear of the recombinant DNA scientists was that
their own early concern about laboratory safety had initiated public
scrutiny of the new research. This was emphasized by the events in
13 CAMBRIDGE EXPERIMENTATION REvIEw BOARD, GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF
RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULE TECHNOLOGY IN THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE (1977).
For the text, see The Cambridge Experimentation Review Board, BULLETIN OF THE
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May 1977, 23-27. Sheldon Krimsky was a member of the board
and has described its deliberations. See KRIMKSY, supra note 2, at 302-07.
14 For a critical examination of the praise for the Cambridge experience as a
model for decision making and public participation with respect to recombinant DNA
safety guidelines, see Rae S. Goodell, Public Involvement in the DNA Controversy:
The Case of Cambridge, Massachusetts, ScI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES, Spring 1997, at
36 (describing a number of failures in the City Council's attempt to regulate recom-
binant DNA technology, such as control of the debate, underlying assumptions, and
"composition of opposing sides" by the scientists and a lack of understanding of the
technical issues by City Council members).
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Cambridge and in other communities such as Ann Arbor, San Di-
ego, New Haven, and Princeton where academic biologists were
tooling up to use recombinant DNA techniques. By 1978, sixteen
separate bills had been introduced in Congress to regulate recom-
binant DNA safety standards by making the NIH guidelines man-
datory for both publicly and privately funded research and pro-
viding enforcement and punishment provisions for any violations.
Research universities and scientific organizations saw this local
and national activity as public "overreaction" threatening their
control of laboratory safety procedures and their research funding.
They vigorously lobbied to oppose or influence legislation. Several
prominent biologists who had shared the early concern about pos-
sible safety hazards of the research publicly recanted, and a reso-
lution to Congress signed by most of the participants in a 1977
Gordon Conference stated that they previously had overstated the
risks and now could provide reassurance that the work was safe.
15
In the end, no legislation was passed by Congress.
By 1979, the NIH Recombinant DNA Guidelines had been
made far more permissive than the original 1976 version. More
than ninety percent of U.S. research in the field was either no
longer covered by the guidelines or was subject to only minimal
controls equivalent to standard laboratory practice. By 1982, most
experiments subject to the guidelines were controlled at the local
level through institutional biosafety committees and RAC re-
viewed only research that had the potential for special safety
problems. No demonstrated harm had been caused by the research
as conducted under the guidelines. A limited amount of risk as-
sessment research had been done during that period and several
small consensus workshops of scientists in the field were held to
review existing knowledge and to refute the earlier concerns.16
NIH's approach to the guidelines was that they would be flexible
enough to respond to new scientific knowledge. That also opened
them up to flexible response to pressures from researchers and
their interests, pressures from industry, and pressures from na-
tional policy priorities and political interests.
15 The conference resolution opposing legislation was described in Walter
Gilbert, Letter, 197 SCIENCE 208 (1977).
16 See generally WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 228-55 (examining three scientific
meetings held in response to the recombinant DNA controversy); KiumsIKY, supra
note 2, at 213-84 (discussing initiatives designed to reassess the hazards of DNA
experimentation due to complaints of some scientists that overly restrictive guidelines
were, perhaps, unnecessarily burdening researchers).
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Downgrading of the guidelines coincided with rapid commer-
cialization of the field and the involvement of academic scientists
in biotechnology companies. In November 1974, during the mora-
torium period, a patent for the recombinant DNA technique was
filed by Stanford University and the University of California on
behalf of two of the scientists who developed the technique. The
patent was granted in 1980 after the Supreme Court decision al-
lowing patenting of human-made organisms.1 7 Biologists and their
universities became involved in what soon became an almost com-
plete commercialization of the work. In the 1980s' political cli-
mate of deregulation, the U.S. biotechnology industry was pro-
moted as a national priority. Emphasis was on government, indus-
try, and media claims of medical, practical, and economic benefits
of the research and the need to develop the industry. Critical ques-
tions about the health and environmental safety of research tech-
niques and products were met by arguments that if the United
States did not move forward rapidly in biotechnology, the country
would lose out in international competition. The "gene gap" argu-
ment was deployed to resist special regulation of the field.
As the guidelines faded away for most laboratory work, atten-
tion shifted from the accidental escape of genetically engineered
microorganisms to the intentional release of these organisms into
the environment for agricultural purposes. The United States De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA) and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the agencies who would ordinarily become in-
volved, initially claimed that they did not yet have the expertise to
evaluate the possible hazards and they urged NIH to provide safety
oversight for these applications through the RAC. Evaluation by
the RAC seemed like a very comfortable approach for scientists
and companies who had been working with it. In the absence of
federal legislation for recombinant DNA, industry had been in vol-
untary compliance with the NIH guidelines. It was not until 1984
that the EPA issued an interim policy statement on field testing of
genetically engineered microbial pesticides. By that time NIH had
approved proposals for small-scale field testing of a genetically
modified organism that was to be sprayed on strawberry and potato
plants to prevent frost damage. The "ice-minus" controversy of the
mid-1980s involved approvals by NIH, EPA, and California agen-
cies, legal challenges by genetic engineering critic Jeremy Rifkin,
17 See Diamond, Comm'r of Patents & Trademarks v. Chakrabarty. 447 U.S.
303 (1980) (holding that a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
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congressional hearings, and protests and demonstrations by citi-
zens in the community where field testing was to occur. As in
Cambridge several years earlier, the citizens asked, "Why are we
the last to know?" The test plot was definitely in their back yard,
but they were not informed of its exact location. They were also
concerned about unresolved safety questions raised by ecologists.
By the time the tests were finally conducted in 1987, RAC's role
in the approval of the environmental release of genetically modi-
fied organisms had been superceded by the EPA. 8
The RAC also played a transitional role in the oversight of
experiments in human gene transfer, generally referred to as gene
"therapy" to reflect the, as yet, unrealized hopes of its advocates.
In 1983, the RAC responded to the report of the President's Com-
mission on Bioethics' study of genetic engineering which consid-
ered several approaches to the oversight of future human genetic
engineering. The commission's study was initiated after the lead-
ers of the three major U.S. religious groups wrote a letter to the
President stimulated by the 1980 Supreme Court decision permit-
ting patenting of genetically engineered organisms. They called for
the study of the ethical issues associated with genetic engineering
and observed that "no government agency or committee [w]as cur-
rently exercising adequate oversight or control, nor addressing the
fundamental ethical questions in a major way.,' 19 RAC's response
to the Commission's report was to establish a Working Group to
consider procedures for reviewing proposals for. human gene ther-
apy. In 1985, RAC's "Points to Consider in the Design and Sub-
mission of Human Somatic Cell Therapy Protocols" was issued by
NIH. They said they would be willing to review proposals for hu-
man gene transfer protocols for somatic cells, but would not "at
present entertain proposals for germ-line interventions.' 20 When
IS See SHELDON KRIMSKY & ALONZO PLOUGH, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:
COMMUNICATING RISKS AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 75-121 (1988) (providing an account of
the "ice-minus" controversy).
19 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, SPUICING LIFE: A REPORT ON THE SOCIAL AND
ETHICAL ISSUES OF GENETIC ENGINEERING WITH HUMAN BEINGS 96 (Nov. 1982)
(providing a reprint of a letter from three general secretaries of national religious
organizations, dated June 20, 1980, posing questions and answers regarding the dan-
gers and benefits that may result from the growth of genetic engineering).
20 For accounts of the development of RAC's role in human gene transfer, see
LEROY WALTERS & JULIE GAGE PALMER, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN GENE THERAPY,
148-51 (1997) (showing the role of the RAC's Working Group in guiding researchers
with human gene therapy); see also Ira H. Carmen, Debates, Divison, and Decisions:
Recombinant DNA Advisor)' Committee (RAC) Authorization of the First Human
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pressed by the Council for Responsible Genetics to specifically
ban human germ-line engineering, the committee refused. Leroy
Walters, the bioethicist who had been for many years a member of
RAC and was the head of its human gene therapy subcommittee,
subsequently argued that voluntary programs of germ-line genetic
intervention are "ethically acceptable in principle.'
The first human gene transfer proposal was received by RAC
in April 1988 and about 100 proposals were reviewed and ap-
proved by 1995. Gene therapy became the primary task of the
group, and since then it has dealt with the scientific validity of
proposals as well as risks for human subjects, the adequacy of in-
formed consent, the role of local institutional review boards, and
the liability of researchers. RAC nurtured the development of hu-
man gene therapy by applying the clinical standards of biomedical
ethics, but bypassed the larger ethical issue of whether it should be
done at all. The role of RAC remained an advisory one to the di-
rector of NIH. In 1995, the Food and Drug Administration became
the regulatory oversight agency for human genetic engineering,
with RAC playing an advisory role in reviewing proposals in-
volving novel techniques or applications.
22
Throughout RAC's history - from its creation in 1974 to deal
with initial concerns about laboratory safety to its current role in
human gene transfer experiments - it has been friendly to re-
Gene Transfer Experiments, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 245 (1992) (arguing that to
understand how the RAC should proceed in orchestrating a human gene therapy pol-
icy agenda, competing vantage points must be analyzed).
21 WALTERS & PALMER, supra note 20, at 91 (evaluating the ethics of allowing
tests of germ-line genetic intervention with humans).
22 For the debate on What role RAC should play in human gene transfer review,
see Henry Miller, Bureaucrats' Bloat in the Laboratory, WALL ST. J., May 10, 1994,
at A-18 (explaining the duplicative reviews that gene therapy clinical trials must un-
dergo, including approval by two separate NIH committees which includes the RAG);
see also Leonard E. Post, Editorial, RAC's Review of Gene Therapy: It's Time to
Move On, 5 HUM. GENE THERAPY 1311, 1312 (1994) (arguing that while RAC was
"an enormously successful instrument of public policy" because it allowed gene ther-
apy to gain public support with minimal controversy and provided greater flexibility
regarding oversight than legislation or Agency regulations, RAC's oversight of gene
therapy is now outdated); Sheldon Krimsky, Editorial, Response to Editorial by
Leonard E. Post, 5 HUM. GENE THERAPY 1313, 1314 (1994) (arguing that regulatory
agencies like the FDA are not in a position to address the ethical decisions regarding
human genetic engineering because they arguably do not have the necessary inde-
pendence, public trust, or ability to have intense public scrutiny currently afforded by
RAG); Doris T. Zallen, Public Oversight Is Necessary if Human Gene Therapy Is to
Progress, 7 HUM. GENE THERAPY 795, 796 (1996) (supporting the RAC's efforts to
develop guidelines regarding the use of recombinant DNA research techniques).
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searchers and dominated by their interests. At the same time, the
work of the committee has been relatively open and visible. NIH
made efforts to create a full public record of the RAC deliberations
and documents in addition to the announcements of meetings, pro-
posed changes in the guidelines, and decisions required to be pub-
lished in the Federal Register. However, very few citizens read
that relatively inaccessible, small-print publication. Nor do many
people have the opportunity to travel to Bethesda to sit in on
committee meetings. The RAC minutes list the non-committee
members who attended the meetings. As the commercialization of
genetic engineering increased from 1980 forward, the record
shows that representatives of companies were consistently present
to follow the deliberations and look after their interests.
Public participation on the RAC was broadened in 1978 in
response to complaints that it was dominated by self-interested
researchers. Yet there were built-in limits and constraints to this
participation because most of the issues placed before the com-
mittee were technical and were often beyond the expertise of the
non-scientists. Another problem was that RAC was increasingly
asked to review industry proposals. Biotechnology companies
were in voluntary compliance with the guidelines and sought NIH
approval for their recombinant DNA work with the condition that
proprietary information would be kept confidential, as was the
practice with federal regulatory agencies, even though NIH was a
research-supporting agency. As a result, public representatives on
the committee frequently were not able to report to the public
about information relevant to environmental and public health.
The development of genetic engineering clearly involves more
than the safety issues that have been the major focus of RAC's
mandate and activities. The larger ethical concerns about where to
draw the line in applications of genetic engineering were occasion-
ally discussed when raised by some members of the committee or
at the request of outside groups. RAC, however, resisted taking a
stand against the use of recombinant DNA techniques for biologi-
cal warfare and refused to recommend an unambiguous ban on the
review of proposals for human germ-line intervention. Instead,
RAC's emphasis was to develop safe procedures for the research,
focusing on how to do it rather than whether it should be done.a3
23 An example of RAC's resistance to efforts by public interest groups to
broaden its approach is documented in the minutes of the January 30, 1989 meeting.
RECOMBINANT DNA ADVISORY COMM., NAT'L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, MIN TrEs OF
MEETING 19-37 (1989).
HEALTH MATRIX
As Leon Kass observed in 1997, "the piecemeal formation of pub-
lic policy tends to grind down large questions of morals into small
questions of procedure., 24 Recombinant DNA research was safer
as a result of the NIH guidelines developed by RAC. The biolo-
gists at Asilomar in 1975, and the subsequent generations of RAC
members, raised important safety issues and set standards for good
laboratory practice.
Despite the success in improving the safety of research, the
quasi-self-regulation model developed in the recombinant DNA
controversy is not adequate for expressing and enforcing societal
and moral limits for potential genetic engineering applications
such as human cloning or human germ-line interventions. These
potential applications are not inevitable and they raise profound
issues beyond laboratory and environmental safety and patients'
rights. They occur in a context of increasing genetic determinism,
pervasive commercialization, and aggressive efforts to sell genetic
intervention as a cure-all for medical and even social problems.
Separation of the technical issues from the ethical issues, and the
narrowing of ethical concerns to clinical biomedical ethics limits
meaningful public involvement, and obscures the larger picture.
24 Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, NEw REPUBLIC, June 2, 1997, at
18. Kass, one of the founders of bioethics in the late 1960s and early 1970s, is critical
of the narrow response of the field to current issues such as potential human cloning
and germ-line intervention.
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